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Abstract
We examined how grounded mental simulations are updated when there is an implied change of shape, over the course of two
(Experiment 1) and four (Experiment 2) sentences. In each preregistered experiment, 84 psychology students completed a
sentence–picture verification task in which they judged as quickly and accurately as possible whether the pictured object was
mentioned in the previous sentence. Participants had significantly higher accuracy scores and significantly shorter response times
when pictures matched the shape implied by the previous sentence than when pictures mismatched the implied shape. These
findings suggest that during language comprehension, mental simulations can be actively updated to reflect new incoming
information.
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Imagine you are reading a story about an eagle that is flying in
the sky. The eagle continues to soar for a while before even-
tually landing in its nest and going to sleep. If you were to
make a drawing of the eagle’s final shape, would the wings of
the eagle be folded? Anyone with some knowledge of how
birds rest in a nest would know that the answer to this question
is Byes,^ but would not have forgotten the bird’s initial shape.
According to the perceptual symbol systems theory (Barsalou,
1999), during language comprehension we activate modal
symbols that can be combined in a mental simulation, which
may involve the same neural structures as would be used if we
were to see the described event in real life. According to Sato,
Schafer, and Bergen (2013), these mental simulations are
formed incrementally, suggesting that while reading this story
about an eagle, we initially created a mental simulation of the
eagle having spread wings as it was flying in the air, followed
by the inclusion of an eagle with folded wings in the simula-
tion later on. What remains unclear is whether or not the final
object replaced the initial simulation, or whether both object
states remain activated in that simulation.
Although there is still some debate as to whether mental rep-
resentations require sensorimotor input or whether amodal
symbols are required (e.g., Mahon & Caramazza, 2008), many
cognitive psychologists believe that sensorimotor input is re-
quired in some form to support language comprehension
(Barsalou, 1999, 2008). Indeed, many behavioral experiments
have shown thatmental simulations can include an object’s shape
(Zwaan, Stanfield, & Yaxley, 2002), color (Hoeben Mannaert,
Dijkstra, & Zwaan, 2017; Zwaan & Pecher, 2012), orientation
(Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001), size (De Koning, Wassenburg, Bos,
& Van der Schoot, 2017), and movement during language com-
prehension (Gentilucci, Benuzzi, Bertolani, Daprati, &
Gangitano, 2000; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002).
In the past, it has been difficult to tease apart whether the
match effects found in word–picture or sentence–picture ver-
ification tasks are due to the visual system being used, or
whether it is only the conceptual system being recruited for
the task (Ostarek & Huettig, 2017). However, recent studies
using a technique called continuous flash suppression in
word–picture verification tasks, where the picture shown is
rendered practically invisible by disrupting the processing of
visual stimuli (Lupyan & Ward, 2013; Ostarek & Huettig,
2017), have provided evidence that spoken words also acti-
vate low-level visual representations. These findings provide
support for the idea that conceptual representations also in-
volve the visual system. Moreover, many neuroimaging stud-
ies have also illustrated that modality-specific sensory, motor,
and affective systems are involved during language compre-
hension (Binder & Desai, 2011; Hauk, Johnsrude, &
Pulvermüller, 2004; Sakreida et al., 2013; Simmons et al.,
2007), illustrating that both behavioral and neuroimaging
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studies support the idea that mental simulations involve sen-
sorimotor activation.
Many studies have targeted the question of what is repre-
sented in a mental simulation, but more and more researchers
are now focusing on how mental simulations unfold across
texts and their relevance for language comprehension. For
instance, a study by Kaup, Lüdtke, and Zwaan (2006) illus-
trated that responses to pictures that matched the situation
described in a preceding sentence were facilitated when the
sentences were affirmative (e.g. The umbrella was open), but
only after a 750-ms delay. This facilitation was no longer
present at 1,500 ms, suggesting that the representation may
have deactivated at that point in time. Sentences described
negatively (e.g. The umbrella was not closed), however, only
led to facilitation after a 1,500 ms delay, but not after 750 ms.
These findings provide evidence for the idea that mental sim-
ulations require additional processing time if sentences are
complex, and that these simulations can become deactivated
after a period of time.
Interestingly, it has also been shown that these simulations
can be reactivated at a later point in time if the context requires
it. For example, reading sentences implying a certain object
shape or orientation leads to faster responses in an object-
verification task performed after a 45minute delay, illustrating
that a mental simulation formed during the reading of a sen-
tence can be reactivated if necessary at a later point in time
(Pecher, Van Dantzig, Zwaan, & Zeelenberg, 2009).
Furthermore, several studies examining the influence of im-
perfective and perfect verb aspect have shown that mental
simulations remain activated longer when there is a descrip-
tion of an ongoing situation (e.g., The boy was building a
doghouse) compared with a description of a situation that
has already occurred (e.g., The boy had built a doghouse;
Madden & Therriault, 2009; Madden & Zwaan, 2003;
Magliano & Schleich, 2000). These studies support the idea
that grammatical markers provide cues for how a situation
model should be constructed and updated.
Radvansky and Zacks (2011; see also Zwaan & Madden,
2004) explain that this updating process can take various
forms: firstly, a new situation model can be constructed (mod-
el creation); secondly, if new information is consistent with
the current situation, it can be incorporated into the existing
model (model elaboration); thirdly, the model can be altered
to accommodate new information (model transformation);
and finally, it can merge two models into one (model
blending). Model creation may be used when there is a shift
to a new event in a narrative—for instance, when a character
moves from one location to the next (Radvansky, 2012).
Model transformation occurs when, for example, contradicto-
ry information needs to be integrated into the existing situation
model. For example, if a person claims to be a vegetarian, but
subsequently eats a hamburger (cf. Albrecht & O’Brien,
1993), this would require the model to be transformed to
accommodate this contradiction. Model elaboration is what
occurs when more information about the current situation is
added without requiring a structural change (e.g., reading
about a jogger in a marathon and eventually noticing that his
shoes are blue. Model blending happens when initially two
events are perceived to be distinct, but eventually are consid-
ered to be part of the same event. For example, if a man walks
into another room to pick up his coat, it may initially be per-
ceived as an event boundary—and thus a separate situation
model would need to be constructed. However, once he
returns to the room he came from while putting on the coat,
it becomes clear that the grabbing and wearing of the coat is
part of an ongoing event, and thus the events need to be
blended into one coherent situation model.
Given that there are various ways in which a situation
model can be updated, how would mental simulations be af-
fected during language comprehension? If mental simulations
are simply Bthe reenactment of perceptual, motor, and intro-
spective states acquired during experience with the world,
body, and mind^ (Barsalou, 2008, p. 618), then would the
process of updating a situation model lead to the activation
of multiple states in a mental simulation, or would only the
Bfinal^ state stay activated? If situation models are represen-
tations of the text that underpin language comprehension, then
any changes occurring in a mental simulation—an important
subcomponent of the situation model—would influence the
construction of the situation model. In other words, if mental
simulations are directly involved in the comprehension pro-
cess, then we would expect mental simulations to update dy-
namically as a narrative unfolds. However, if mental simula-
tions are not directly involved, but are rather a function that
activates all relevant perceptual input—which is subsequently
distinguished by higher order cognitive processes—then it
would make sense for all relevant perceptual input to be acti-
vated in a mental simulation. As such, in order to gain a full
understanding of how mental simulations are involved in lan-
guage comprehension, it is important to find out how the
updating process affects mental simulations. Most studies
have only focused on situation model updating by looking at
the slowdown of reading as a measure for this updating pro-
cess, but these studies fail to provide a complete picture of this
updating process. When reading about inflating a balloon, it is
of course interesting to know that there is an increase in pro-
cessing time necessary to comprehend the changes to the sit-
uation model, but what exactly happens to the representations
described by that sentence? Does the initial shape of the bal-
loon (i.e., deflated) stay activated as the final shape (i.e., in-
flated balloon) also activates? Or does the deflated balloon
representation deactivate as the inflated balloon activates?
An fMRI study by Hindy, Solomon, Altmann, and
Thompson-Schill (2015) suggests that the brain does encode
object state changes, using short sentence items such as
Binflate the balloon^ to investigate this. Their results
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suggested that the ventral visual cortex encodes both the initial
object state (e.g., deflated balloon) and the final object state
(e.g., inflated balloon). Furthermore, the authors suggest that
the posterior parietal cortex may be recruited for conceptual
binding, so that the distinct states are bound together in a
stable representation. These findings suggest that we have to
knowwhat an initial object state is in order to comprehend that
a change in state is occurring. Possibly, this could mean that
when a change in an object state is described, that both object
representations are activated in a mental simulation.
To our knowledge, only one study thus far has explored
what happens to mental simulations of changing object states.
Sato et al. (2013) were interested in finding out whether men-
tal simulations are formed incrementally (i.e., while reading a
sentence) or after all the information has been obtained (i.e., at
the end of the sentence). If a mental simulation is only formed
once all the information has been collected, then it would be
unlikely for an initial object state to be activated. If a mental
simulation is formed incrementally, however, multiple object
states could become activated and potentially deactivated dur-
ing the process of comprehension. To explore this, Sato et al.
had participants read a Japanese sentence where an expecta-
tion of an object shape was created, but contradicted at the end
of the sentence. For example, in one item, participants read
about a person wearing a yukata (a cotton kimono) to a fire-
works festival, but the yukata had been torn apart. As Japanese
is a verb-final language, this was an ideal medium by which to
create an expectation of an object shape (i.e., a whole yukata)
and examine what a subsequent contradiction would do to the
mental simulation of this event. In order to test which shape
would be simulated, they used a picture-verification task ei-
ther before or after the final verb in the sentence. Their results
showed that participants responded faster to the picture
matching the shape implied both before and after the final
verb, suggesting that mental simulations are formed incremen-
tally and that an initial shape can be deactivated in a mental
simulation if a person is presented with information that con-
tradicts earlier expectations.
What remains unclear, however, from Sato et al.’s (2013)
findings, is whether an initial shape activation would become
deactivated in a mental simulation when no contradictory in-
formation is supplied. For example, when reading a sentence
pair such as BThe eagle was moving through the air. That
evening, the eagle was resting in its nest,^ the latter sentence
does not contradict the event that took place earlier on.
Instead, the eagle has spread wings while it is flying, which
changes to an eagle having folded wings once it is resting later
on. At the end of this sentence pair, would a person still have
the initial object state active in a mental simulation, or would
this have been deactivated? We are interested in finding out
whether implied changes in shape lead to the simultaneous
activation of both object shapes, or whether only the final
shape remains active in the mental simulation. Asmost studies
examining situation model updating use reading times as a
dependent variable, using a sentence–picture verification task
offers a unique way to explore how these mental simulations
unfold, and whether this updating process requires both visual
representations to be active simultaneously, or whether the
final representation becomes active as the prior one deacti-
vates. Such a task allows us to glean additional information
regarding the nature of mental simulation updating, which
cannot be done with reading-time tasks alone.
The present study
Two experiments were conducted to examine how mental
simulations are updated when changes in implied shape are
described over the course of several sentences, using a
sentence–picture verification task. Participants had to read ei-
ther two (Experiment 1) or four (Experiment 2) sentences that
described either a change in shape (change condition) or no
change in shape (constant condition), followed by a picture
that either matched or mismatched the shape implied by the
final sentence, where they had to decide whether the pictured
object was mentioned in the text.
Given that previously simulated information can be
reactivated when necessary (Pecher et al . , 2009;
Sundermeier, van der Broek, & Zwaan, 2005) and can contin-
ue to influence language comprehension in the future
(O’Brien, Cook, & Guéraud, 2010), it is possible that, in a
context where both object states are implied immediately
one after the other, both would remain activated in order to
update the situation model. This could potentially occur dur-
ing model elaboration as opposed to model creation
(Radvansky & Zacks, 2011). It is also possible, however, that
due to mental simulations being formed incrementally, that the
initial object state is replaced immediately when the second
state is mentioned. This explanation would fall in line with
what is proposed in the event horizon model (Radvansky,
2012). According to the event horizon model, a new model
is created at event boundaries and could therefore suggest the
initial object state is replaced immediately. If the newer object
state is then activated in the new situation model, then re-
sponse times should be shorter when the new object is
displayed compared with when the first object is displayed.
As such, if reading about a change in an object’s shape is
considered to be an event boundary, then we can expect
shorter response times when the picture shown matches the
changed object’s shape compared to when it mismatches this
shape. If instead the model is merely elaborated upon, then no
differences would be expected when the picture shown
matches the first-mentioned or last-mentioned object.
We hypothesized that in Experiment 1, where one shape is
mentioned directly after the other, that both shapes would
remain activated in the mental simulation as we expected
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model elaboration to occur, rather than creation. Therefore, we
predicted to find no significant differences in the response
times between the match and mismatch condition in the
shape-change condition. We did expect a match effect in the
shape-constant condition, as this would be consistent with
findings from previous studies (e.g., Zwaan & Pecher, 2012;
Zwaan et al., 2001). In Experiment 2, however, the final object
shape was emphasized using the final three sentences (out of
four total). In this experiment, we expected that the initial
shape would become deactivated as more emphasis was
placed on the final shape. Specifically, we predicted a signif-
icant match advantage in the response times in both the shape-
change and shape-constant conditions in this experiment. We
made no specific predictions regarding the accuracy scores in
both Experiments 1 and 2.
Ethics statement
The participation in all experiments and in the norming study
was voluntary. The participants subscribed to the experiments
online via the university platform and were told that by
signing up for a study, they declare to voluntarily participate
in this study. They were briefed with the content of each study,
but obtaining further written consent was not required by the
Ethics Committee of Psychology at the Erasmus University
Rotterdam, The Netherlands, who approved the project, be-
cause the experiments were noninvasive and the data collected
were processed anonymously.
Preregistration
The predictions, exclusion criteria, design, methods, analyses,
and materials of all the experiments reported in this article
were preregistered in advance of data collection and analysis
on the Open Science Framework (OSF) to ensure confirmato-
ry procedures were conducted according to a priori criteria.1
Analyses that were not preregistered are referred to in this
article under the heading Exploratory Analyses.
Experiment 1
Method
Norming study In the current study, participants read
sentences where a certain shape is implied, rather than explic-
itly stated. In order to ensure that the sentences did imply the
shape we intended them to, a norming study was conducted.
Forty-one participants were recruited via Mechanical Turk
(www.mturk.com) and were paid $3.50 for completion of
the survey, which took approximately 30 minutes to
complete. The participants had a mean age of 35.10 years
(SD = 10.87) and consisted of 19 females and 22 males.
Participants in the norming study read 280 sentences
(seven sentences were written for 40 different items for
Experiments 1 and 2) that implied a certain object shape
(e.g., The bat was entering the cave) and had to determine
which of the shown pictures best matched the sentence.
There was also an option where participants could state that
neither picture matched the sentence they read and they could
provide comments to elaborate on their reasoning. By doing
the norming study in this manner, we could ensure that the
final items we would end up using would actually imply the
shape we wanted it imply. For example, for the item about an
eagle, 91.30% of participants agreed that our matching picture
corresponded to the shape implied by the sentence BThe eagle
was moving through the air,^ while 82.61% agreed that our
matching picture corresponded to the sentence BThe eagle was
resting in its nest.^ If we consider an item to be the object of
the sentences, then each item would lead to seven ratings per
participant (i.e., one rating for the sentence about the eagle
moving through the air, another rating for the sentence about
the eagle resting in the nest, and so on). For the results, we
looked at the sentence of an item that contained the lowest
percentage of agreement across participants in order to be
conservative in our final selection of stimuli. The results of
the study illustrated that the stimulus set contained several
items where the minimum average agreement on what shape
matched which sentence was less than 61%. Furthermore, on
some of the items, participants made comments suggesting the
item contained an incorrect logical match between sentence
and picture. To improve the quality of the stimulus set and to
ensure the final set contained a number of stimuli that was a
multiple of four (due to counterbalancing), 12 items were
removed. This left us with 28 experimental items that had a
minimum average agreement of 77.52% (SD = 7.73%) regard-
ing which picture best represented which sentence.
Participants We expected to need 84 participants to find an
effect if it existed—based on a power analysis performed on
the results of the Zwaan et al. (2002) study—and therefore
continued data collection until this goal had been met, re-
placing participants that had to be excluded due to having
total accuracy scores below 80%. As a result of this mea-
sure, only one participant was excluded and replaced. The
final sample consisted of 84 participants (ages 17–29 years,
Mage = 20.33 years, SDage = 2.04 years, 71 females, 13
males), who were students of the International Bachelor
Programme of Psychology (IBP) at the Erasmus University
Rotterdam in The Netherlands. IBP students are required to
have a minimum level of 80 on the Test of English as a
Foreign Language (TOEFL), or a 6.0 on the International
English Language Testing System (IELTS), or be native
1 The preregistration can be viewed on https://osf.io/f7m3q/register/
565fb3678c5e4a66b5582f67
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speakers of English. Participants were reimbursed with
course credit.
Sentences Twenty-eight experimental sentence pairs and 28
filler sentence pairs were used in the experiment for each
experiment block. The sentence pairs in one block involved
an implied change in shape (change condition), and the
sentences in the other block involved no change in shape
(constant condition). See Fig. 1 for an example of the sentence
stimuli. Of the experimental sentence pairs, two versions were
created for counterbalancing purposes to account for typicality
effects. The first version ensured that the final sentence im-
plied one of two possible object shapes (e.g., eagle–folded
wings), while the second version ensured the final sentence
implied the other possible shape (e.g., eagle–spread wings).
To be able to counterbalance in this way without manipulating
time aspect in the sentences, we could only use objects that
were reversible in shape. For example, an eagle is able to fold
its wings and then spread them again, and vice versa. An egg,
however, could only ever start out as a whole egg and then
become a fried egg, not the other way around.
Pictures Eighty-four pictures were created for use in this ex-
periment, of which 56 were used for the experimental
sentences and 28 for the filler sentences. During the experi-
mental procedure, each sentence pair was followed by a picture
that either matched or mismatched the implied shape, thus
requiring the creation of two picture versions of a particular
object. For example, if the sentence stated that the eagle was in
the air, then a picture of either an eagle with spread wings or a
picture of an eagle with folded wings could be shown. The
pictures were obtained from the Internet (Google Image search
engine) and were edited with the Paint.NET software to be
displayed as grayscale (to ensure that effects of color could
not confound the results), to not exceed a 300 × 300 pixel
resolution (approximately 7.9 cm × 7.9 cm on-screen). The
experiment was programmed using E-Prime 2.0 Professional,
and participants completed the experiments in isolated cubicles
with computers equipped with 24.1-in. TFT-IPS screens, with
a resolution of 1,920 × 1,200 and a ratio of 16:10.
Design and procedure The experiment was a 2 (match: match
vs. mismatch) × 2 (shape: change vs. constant) × 2 (block:
Block 1 shown first vs. Block 2 shown first) × 2 (sentence:
Version 1 vs. Version 2) mixed-subjects design, resulting in
eight counterbalanced lists. Match and shape were tested
within subjects, meaning that participants viewed pictures that
matched and mismatched implied shape, and viewed
sentences that either implied a change in shape (change con-
dition) or did not (constant condition). Block and sentence
were between-subjects variables that ensured that, firstly, half
of all participants were shown Block 1 during Session 1 (con-
taining only the change-condition items) and then Block 2
during Session 2, while the other half were shown Block 2
during Session 1, followed by Block 1 during Session 2.
Participants completed each session 1 week apart to ensure
that there were no carryover effects from one set of materials
to another. Secondly, each experimental sentence pair could
imply one of two object states (i.e., a sentence implying an
eagle with spread wings or a sentence implying eagle with
folded wings). This variable was also tested between-
subjects so that half of all participants viewed the sentence
implying one of the object states and that the other half viewed
the sentence implying the other object state. Within the same
block, part icipants received each item once. We
counterbalanced the experiment in this way to ensure that
neither block order nor problems with typicality could be pos-
sible explanations for the results.
Picture
Shape Sentence Match Mismatch
Change The eagle was moving through the air. That 
evening the eagle was resting in its nest. The 
eagle continued perching in its nest. The eagle 
looked at ease in the nest.
Constant The eagle was moving through the air. That 
evening the eagle was still moving through the 
air. The eagle continued flying in the air. The 
eagle looked at ease in the air.
Fig. 1 Example of stimulus material used in Experiments 1 and 2
(italics). Experiment 2 used the first sentences from Experiment 1 and
had two sentences added at the end to continue emphasizing one shape.
Pictures under BMatch^ refer to a picture matching the shape implied by
the final sentence, whereas BMismatch^ refers to a picture mismatching
the shape implied by the final sentence. The full list of stimuli can be
viewed here: https://mfr.osf.io/render?url=https://osf.io/3hrq8/?action=
download%26mode=render
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Participants were instructed that they would perform a
self-paced reading task using the spacebar and that they
would see a picture after the second sentence, and that they
must answer whether the pictured object was mentioned in
the previous sentence. They were instructed to press the L
key for YES responses and the A key for NO responses.
Participants first received five practice sentences. A trial
proceeded as follows: the > sign was shown for 1,000 ms
in the center of the screen (left aligned), signifying that they
would receive a new sentence sequence. Following this, they
saw the first sentence (left aligned), and had to press space
to signify they understood the sentence, before immediately
seeing the second sentence on the screen. Once they pressed
the spacebar, they saw a fixation cross in the center (center
aligned) of the screen for 500 ms to prepare them for a
response. We chose 500 ms as the interstimulus interval as
this is commonly used in sentence–picture verification stud-
ies (e.g., De Koning et al., 2017; Hoeben Mannaert et al.,
2017; Zwaan & Pecher, 2012). Following the fixation cross,
they saw the picture in the center of the screen, which
remained on-screen until they had given a response. All of
the experimental items (i.e., both the match and mismatch
conditions) required a YES response, whereas all of the filler
items required a NO response. Half of all filler items also
ended with a comprehension question, to ensure they prop-
erly read the sentences, where they had to give a YES/NO
response using the L and A keys, respectively.
Data analysis A repeated-measures analysis of variance
(rmANOVA) was conducted to test whether participants were
faster in their response and whether they were more accurate
when the picture matched than when it mismatched for both
the change and constant conditions. Only the response times
for accurate responses were used in the final analysis, and the
median reaction times were analyzed instead of the mean re-
sponse times. Many experiments using the sentence–picture
verification task use the median for the analyses, as it elimi-
nates the necessity to make decisions on outliers (such as use
of cutoffs based on standard deviations, absolute RTs, or other
methods; Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001; Zwaan & Pecher, 2012).
Subject analyses are shown with the subscript B1^ (e.g., F1),
and item analyses2 are shown with the subscript B2^ (e.g., F2).
Results
Accuracy Table 1 shows a summary of the descriptives for the
change and constant conditions. The rmANOVA for accuracy
demonstrated a main effect for match, where participants in
the match condition responded more accurately than in the
mismatch condition, F1(1, 83) = 17.63, p < .001, ηp
2 =
0.175; F2(1, 27) = 15.79, p < .001).
3 A main effect for shape
was also found, where participants in the shape-change con-
dition responded more accurately than participants in the
shape-constant condition, F1(1, 83) = 8.71, p = .004, ηp
2 =
0.095; F2(1, 27) = 4.24, p = .049. There was no significant
interaction between match and shape, F1(1, 83) = 0.003, p =
.959; F2(1, 27) = 0.21, p = .648. Paired-sample t tests showed
that there was a significant match effect in both the shape-
change, t1(83) = 3.59, p < .001, and the shape-constant con-
ditions, t1(83) = 2.18, p = .032. The item analyses showed no
significant effect of picture version, F2(1, 27) = 0.06, p = .809.
Response time The rmANOVA for response time (performed
on correct responses only) found a main effect for match,
where participants responded significantly faster when the
picture matched than when it mismatched the shape implied
by the final sentence, F1(1, 83) = 10.80, p = .001, ηp
2 = 0.115;
F2(1, 27) = 9.95, p = .004.
4 There was no significant main
effect of shape, F1(1, 83) = 0.46, p = .502; F2(1, 27) = 0.84, p
= .366, nor a significant interaction between shape and match,
F1(1, 83) = 0.189, p = .665; F2(1, 27) = 0.21, p = .654. Paired-
sample t tests showed that participants were significantly
faster in the match condition in both the shape-change,
t1(83) = −2.51, p = .014, and the shape-constant conditions,
t1(83) = −2.02, p = .047. There was also a significant effect of
picture version in the item analyses, F2(1, 27) = 4.72, p = .039.
Exploratory analyses: Comprehension accuracy
To examine whether participants did properly read both
sentences in the experiment, the accuracy scores to the com-
prehension questions were analyzed. Sixteen comprehension
questions focused on the final sentence in the pair, whereas 12
questions focused on the first sentence in the pair. Average
comprehension accuracy was high at 89.07% (SD =
12.20%) for questions focused on the first sentence as well
as for questions targeted at the second sentence (M = 88.69%,
SD = 11.61%). A paired-samples t test found no significant
difference between comprehension accuracy for questions
targeting Sentence 1 and Sentence 2, t(83) = .31, p = .761.
Discussion
As can be seen from Table 1, overall accuracy of participants
was high in each condition. However, even though it was
2 The item analyses were not preregistered but were included as part of the
main analyses as this is conventional.
3 These analyses excluded the counterbalancing measures such as Bsentence
version^ and Bblock order^ as these were not included in our preregistered
analysis plan.When included, the results for match,F(1, 76) = 17.59, p < .001,
and shape, F(1, 76) = 9.86, p = .002, remained the same. The effect sizes of the
counterbalancingmeasures are not reported due to lack of theoretical relevance
(Madden-Lombardi, Dominey, & Ventre-Dominey, 2017; Pollatsek & Well,
1995; Raaijmakers, Schrijnemakers, & Gremmen, 1999).
4 These analyses excluded the counterbalancing measures such as Bsentence
version^ and Bblock order^ as these were not included in our preregistered
analysis plan. When included, the results for match, F(1,76) = 10.36, p = .002,
and shape, F(1, 76) = .65, p = .424, remained the same.
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high, participants still responded less accurately when the pic-
ture mismatched the final object shape in both the change
condition (2% difference) and the constant condition (3% dif-
ference). The participants’ task was to respond as quickly and
accurately as possible whether the pictured object was men-
tioned in the previous sentence. Even though this was clearly
the case, participants still responded in such a way that when
the picture mismatched the implied shape, they were slightly
less likely to press the YES response. This could suggest that
participants are more inclined to match the picture they see to
the image that is present in their mental simulation, rather than
compare it to the text base. Furthermore, participants also
responded slightly more accurately in the shape-change con-
dition compared with the shape-constant condition. The event
horizon model (Radvansky, 2012) provides a potential expla-
nation for this effect. According to this model, memory is
enhanced during the perception of an event boundary. As
such, it could be that the change condition led to the percep-
tion of an event boundary but that this was not the case when
there was no implied change in shape. However, the fact that
these percentage differences are so small limits the overall
strength of these conclusions.
We also found a standard match effect for both the shape-
change and constant conditions, which went against our ex-
pectations. The results suggest that the most recently implied
shape is more highly activated than the first-mentioned shape
in situations that involve a change in shape.What this suggests
is that mental simulations appear to update in a manner that
replaces the initially simulated object, rather than activating
both objects in unison. This would mean that, although an
object can be reactivated when necessary (such as in Pecher
et al., 2009), this is not required for the purpose of updating
mental simulations.
Additionally, it looks as though the updating process does
not seem to take additional cognitive effort during object
changes compared with when there is no change occurring,
as no significant differences in response times were found
between the change and constant conditions. It is also
possible, however, that no differences were found between
the change and constant conditions because both required
model creation, as the sentence items included a time shift,
which has been related to slowdown of reading times in past
studies (e.g., Speer & Zacks, 2005) and thus could have also
influenced response times during object-verification.
Experiment 2
Experiment 1 illustrated that the final implied object shape is
more activated in a mental simulation than the initial one. In
Experiment 2, we wanted to see whether this result would
replicate using four sentences instead of two. Most studies
using the sentence–picture verification paradigm only exam-
ine the match effect using one sentence, therefore it is of in-
terest to see whether this effect holds out under more natural
conditions. To test this, the same stimuli were used as in the
Experiment 1, except that two more sentences were added to
increase the time between the activation of the initial shape
and the response. Thus, in each item, the first sentence implied
one shape of an object, whereas the final three sentences im-
plied either another shape of that object (i.e., in the shape-
change condition) or again the same shape (i.e., in the
shape-constant condition). We expected to find a match ad-
vantage for both the shape-constant and the shape-change
conditions in Experiment 2.
Method
Participants We again aimed to have 84 participants in our
sample and therefore continued data collection until this goal
had been met, replacing participants that had to be excluded
due to having total accuracy scores below 80%. As a result of
this measure, seven participants were excluded and replaced.
The final sample consisted of 84 participants (ages 18–47
years, Mage = 21.08 years, SDage = 4.32 years, 62 females),
who were IBP students at the Erasmus University Rotterdam
Table 1 Overview of match effects in Experiments 1 and 2
Accuracy Response time
Match
M (SD)
Mismatch
M (SD)
Match
M (SD)
Mismatch
M (SD)
Effect size
(Cohen’s dz)
BF10
Experiment 1
Change 0.97 (0.05) 0.95 (0.07) 572.90 (150.20) 607.50 (224.50) -0.27 4.52
Constant 0.95 (0.09) 0.92 (0.08) 588.60 (181.30) 614.80 (181.50) -0.22 1.62
Experiment 2
Change 0.97 (0.05) 0.95 (0.06) 655.00 (233.60) 679.60 (268.40) -0.22 1.53
Constant 0.97 (0.05) 0.91 (0.14) 646.60 (227.90) 662.40 (264.80) -0.13 0.43
Note.Response times are shown inms. Reported effect sizes are for the comparison of response time. Bayes factors were calculated using a Cauchy prior
of 0.707 as a one-sided Bayesian paired-samples t test, using the JASP software (Version 0.9.0.1) for the calculations
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in The Netherlands, and had a minimum level of 80 on the
TOEFL, or a 6.0 on the IELTS. Participants were reimbursed
with course credit.
Materials The sentence items contained four sentences. The
first two sentences of the item were identical to the ones from
Experiment 1. The final two sentences continued implying the
shape mentioned in the second sentence. Aside from this
change in the stimuli, all materials were the same as that of
Experiment 1. An example of the stimuli can be seen in Fig. 1.
Design and procedure The design and procedure of
Experiment 2 were the same as that of Experiment 1.
Results
Accuracy The data fromExperiment 2 were analyzed using the
samemethod as in Experiment 1. Table 1 shows a summary of
the descriptives for the change and constant conditions. The
rmANOVA for accuracy found a main effect for match, where
participants in the match condition responded more accurately
than in the mismatch condition, F1(1, 83) = 13.81, p < .001,
ηp
2 = 0.14; F2(1, 27) = 11.90, p = .002).
5 A main effect for
shape was also found in the subject analyses (but not in the
item analyses), where participants in the shape-change condi-
tion responded more accurately than participants in the shape-
constant condition, F1(1, 83) = 4.09, p = .046, ηp
2 = 0.05;
F2(1, 27) = 3.57, p = .069. There was also a significant inter-
action between match and shape, F1(1, 83) = 4.74, p = .032,
ηp
2 = 0.05; F2(1, 27) = 8.63, p = .007. Paired-sample t tests
showed that the match effect was significant for both the
shape-change, t1(83) = 2.34, p = .022, and the shape-
constant conditions, t1(83) = 3.36, p = .001. There was no
significant effect of picture version, F2(1, 27) = 0.53, p = .473.
Response time The rmANOVA for response time (performed
on correct responses only) found a main effect for match in the
subject analyses (but not in the item analyses), where partici-
pants responded significantly faster when the picture matched
than when it mismatched the shape implied by the final sen-
tence, F1(1, 83) = 5.54, p = .021, ηp
2 = 0.06; F2(1, 27) = 2.28,
p = .143).6 There was no significant main effect of shape,
F1(1, 83) = 0.25, p = .615; F2(1, 27) = 0.08, p = .776, nor a
significant interaction between shape and match, F1(1, 83) =
0.22, p = .638; F2(1, 27) = 1.10, p = .304. Paired-sample t tests
illustrated no significant match effect for the shape-change
condition, t1(83) = −1.99, p = .050, and the shape-constant
condition, t1(83) = −1.21, p = .228. Figure 2 illustrates a
boxplot comparison of the response times per condition for
Experiments 1 and 2. There was also no significant effect of
picture version, F2(1, 27) = 0.09, p = .772.
Exploratory analyses: Meta-analysis
We performed a meta-analysis on the data to examine the
evidence for a match effect existing in the shape-change and
shape-constant conditions (see Fig. 3). The meta-analysis was
performed using R Version 3.3.2 (R Core Team, 2016) using
the package metafor (Viechtbauer, 2010). The code can be
viewed in the Appendix. The results illustrated a 29.31-ms
match advantage in the shape-change condition, and a
20.66-ms match advantage in the shape-constant condition,
both significant (p = .0014 and p = .025, respectively), pro-
viding overall support for the notion that comprehenders do
actively update their mental simulations.
Comprehension accuracyTo examine whether participants did
properly read the sentences in the experiment, the accuracy
scores to the comprehension questions were analyzed. Sixteen
comprehension questions focused on the second sentence,
whereas 12 questions focused on the first sentence. Average
comprehension accuracy was high at 85.42% (SD = 10.97%)
for questions focused on the first sentence as well as for ques-
tions targeted at the second sentence (M = 80.58%, SD =
10.72%). A paired-samples t test found that participants were
significantly more accurate on questions targeting the first
sentence compared with the second sentence, t(83) = 3.96, p
< .001.
Mismatch accuracy To further examine the interaction found
in the accuracy scores, we performed a paired-samples t test to
see whether the difference in mismatch accuracy between the
shape-constant and shape-change conditions were significant.
The results showed that when the picture mismatched the
shape implied, participants were significantly more accurate
in the shape-change condition (M = .95, SD = .06) than in the
shape-constant condition (M = .91, SD = .14), t(83) = 2.37, p =
.020.
Discussion
The aim of Experiment 2 was to find out whether the updating
of mental simulations still takes place when participants read
four sentences, where the first sentence implies one shape and
the final three imply another. The analysis of the accuracy
scores revealed an interesting pattern, where participants were
most accurate in the match condition, regardless of whether
the sentences implied a change in shape or not, but were sig-
nificantly less accurate in the mismatch condition, which
interacted with the shape condition. Inspecting the data more
5 These analyses excluded the counterbalancing measures such as Bsentence
version^ and Bblock order^ as these were not included in our preregistered
analysis plan.When included, the results for match,F(1, 76) = 14.19, p < .001,
shape, F(1, 76) = 4.06, p = .047), and the interaction betweenmatch and shape,
F(1, 76) = 4.78, p = .032, remained the same.
6 These analyses excluded the counterbalancing measures such as Bsentence
version^ and Bblock order^ as these were not included in our preregistered
analysis plan. When included, the results for match, F(1, 76) = 4.75, p = .032,
and shape, F(1, 76) = 0.07 p = .797, remained the same.
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closely, it appears that participants were more accurate in the
mismatch condition when a change in shape was implied com-
pared to when no change was implied. It is possible that this
finding is due to enhanced memory during event boundaries
as proposed by the event horizon model, but then we would
have expected to also find better accuracy in match condition
when a change in shape was implied, which we did not. An
alternative explanation for this finding is that participants in
the shape-constant condition experienced a continued rein-
forcement of a single shape (e.g., an eagle with spread wings)
Fig. 3 Meta-analysis of Experiments 1 and 2
Fig. 2 Box plot illustrating a comparison of response times and spread of data for Experiments 1 and 2
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over the course of four sentences. If they are then confronted
with a picture that displays a shape that does not overlap with
what is present in their mental simulation, they are more likely
to state that the pictured object was not mentioned in the
previous sentences. In the shape-change condition this would
not be the case, as both shapes would have been mentioned in
the sentences, resulting in slightly higher accuracy scores.
Similar to Experiment 1, however, given that the differences
in percentage accuracy is so small between conditions, these
conclusions should be interpreted with necessary caution.
The analysis for response times in Experiment 2 did not
show the interaction found for accuracy scores. Instead, only a
main match effect was found for subjects, where participants
were again faster at responding when the picture matched the
shape implied by the final sentence than when it mismatched.
The paired-samples t test, however, illustrated no significant
match effect in the shape change and constant conditions.
Similarly, the item analyses found no significant match effect.
We expect that these findings may be explained by the less
natural wording of the sentences in the shape-constant condi-
tion. Although we had aimed to create more realistic stimuli
by adding more sentences, it is possible that our manipulation
caused the opposite effect. The continued emphasis of only
one shape throughout all four sentences may have encouraged
a surface-level representation, which may have resulted in a
weaker activation of all relevant visual representations, lead-
ing to a lack of a match effect. Nevertheless, when we con-
ducted a meta-analysis over the data from Experiments 1 and
2, we found a significant match effect of 29.31 ms for the
shape-change condition, and a significant match effect of
20.66 ms for the shape-constant condition. This again sup-
ports the idea that mental simulations can be actively updated.
Finally, we found that participants were significantly more
accurate on the comprehension questions targeting the first
sentence compared with those targeting the second sentence.
It is possible that this could be explained by the primacy ef-
fect, being that items coming first are remembered better than
those that come directly afterward.
General discussion
Over the past decade, much research has been conducted to find
out which object properties are represented in mental simula-
tions. Recently, however, more and more researchers have be-
come interested in understanding what the underlying mecha-
nisms of mental simulations are and how they unfold during
language comprehension. We were specifically interested in
how mental simulations update when a change in shape is im-
plied over the course of two (Experiment 1) and four
(Experiment 2) sentences, using a sentence–picture verification
task to test this. We hypothesized that if you imply one object
shape in one sentence, and then imply the other in the sentence
that follows, both shapes would remain active in a mental sim-
ulation, leading to no match advantage. We further hypothe-
sized that when more sentences are added that continue to em-
phasize the final object shape, only the final shape will remain
active in a mental simulation, leading to a match advantage.
Our findings do not support our first hypothesis and provide
tentative support for our second hypothesis. We found a signif-
icant match effect across the shape-change and shape-constant
conditions in both Experiments 1 and 2. Upon closer investiga-
tion, we found that both the shape-change and shape-constant
conditions in Experiment 1 had a significant match effect, but
neither condition was significant in Experiment 2. In order to
determine whether themost recent shape is more activated in the
mental simulation when a change in shape is implied, a meta-
analysis was conducted over the data from both experiments.
The findings from the meta-analysis support the conclusion that
participants have the final shape more activated in the mental
simulation, with an overall match advantage of 29.31 ms.
During the process of language comprehension, a compre-
hensive situation model is built that results in the same (or
similar) sensorimotor activation as when the described event
is experienced. In a task where participants are asked to com-
pare what they see in the picture with what they have read, it
would be possible for them to either compare the picture with
the surface structure of the text or to compare it to the con-
structed situation model. In the first case, we would not expect
a difference between any conditions as we tried to avoid mak-
ing explicit references to object shapes. If the picture is com-
pared at the level of the situation model, however, we would
expect the matching picture to lead to faster responses, as the
situation model includes all other information that is not only
explicitly mentioned in the text (but is still relevant to the
aspects of the situation). This is indeed what we found in the
current study. If the sentence–picture verification task causes
us to compare the viewed picture with our constructed situation
model, it would make sense that when there is overlap between
the two, we are more likely to answer Byes^ in the context of
this task. This then also explains why accuracy was higher in
the shape-change condition, as the picture will always overlap
with one of the implied shapes. In the shape-constant condi-
tion, however, there are more constraints on what the object
shape could be, so if there is less overlap between picture and
model (i.e., in the mismatch condition), it makes sense that
there are fewer people who would choose to answer in favor
of the picture having been mentioned in the previous sentence.
An alternative explanation to this boosted accuracy effect
in the shape-change condition comes from the event horizon
model (Radvansky, 2012), which proposes that memory is
enhanced at event boundaries. Although we cannot conclude
that there were event boundaries in between the sentences of
the shape-change condition, as this was not tested, if partici-
pants indeed perceive the two different object shapes de-
scribed in the text as separate events (i.e., model creation;
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Radvansky & Zacks, 2011), it would explain why there was
enhanced accuracy in this condition.
In the introduction, we stated that it makes sense that men-
tal representations can be reactivated at a later point in time if
the context requires it (e.g., Pecher et al., 2009; Sundermeier
et al., 2005). Indeed, if the comprehender cannot reactivate a
previously encountered object state, then an explicit under-
standing of changes involving that state would become diffi-
cult to grasp. However, our results seem to suggest that for the
purposes of updating mental simulations, no reactivation of
prior object states are necessary.
The results from the current study support the idea that
mental simulations are updated when there is an implied
change in object shape. At this point we cannot determine
whether our results are inconsistent with those reported by
Hindy et al. (2015), who concluded in an fMRI study that both
the initial object state (e.g., deflated balloon) and the final
object state (e.g., inflated balloon) are encoded when an object
changes shape in a sentence (e.g., Binflate the balloon^), as it
is possible that there would still be some activation of the
initial object state left. Our results do support the findings of
Sato et al. (2013), who reported that mental simulations can be
updated when participants receive information contradictory
to the initially simulated shape.
Now that it has been established that mental simulations
change the activation levels of the object traces during the
process of updating, future research could focus on howmuch
of the initial object trace remains activated when there is new
incoming information, which could be investigated by in-
creasing the ISI between the final sentence and the picture.
Furthermore, it may prove beneficial to replicate the current
study to improve the reliability of these findings.
Limitations
The current study has a few limitations that may limit the
strength of our conclusions. Although the current study used
more sentences than are typically used in a sentence–picture
verification paradigm with the intent to create more natural
discourse, the stimuli used could still be considered
impoverished textoids compared with that of common dis-
course seen in everyday life, which limits the generalizability
of our findings (Graesser, Millis, & Zwaan, 1997).
Additionally, due to the difficulty in creating items that can
both change and reverse shape, it is possible that several items
may refer to an object’s shape more explicitly than others,
though we did our best to ensure that this was not the case.
As such, it would be prudent for future studies to continue
trying to improve the quality of the texts used in experiments.
A second potential limitation to this study are the task de-
mands of a sentence–picture verification task, as there is some
debate as to whether this paradigm encourages explicit visual
processing, and that by extension, outside of this experimental
setting, the nature of these representations would vary. Indeed,
sentence–picture verification tasks on their own are unlikely
to be valid in terms of the conclusions that can be made re-
garding visual representations. However, there are many stud-
ies that have found match effects using various methods, such
as electroencephalography (Coppens, Gootjes, & Zwaan,
2012), memory tasks (Pecher et al., 2009), and naming tasks
(Zwaan et al., 2002), which all support the idea that the visual
system is recruited during language comprehension.
A final limitation to our study is that the comprehension
questions we asked the participants were not equally targeting
Sentences 1 and 2, and that a significant difference was found
in the comprehension accuracies between the two sentences in
Experiment 2. Although comprehension accuracy was not a
variable of interest to us during the design of this experiment,
those results are still relevant, as the significant difference in
comprehension accuracy could imply that participants read
the first sentence more carefully than the remaining sentences
in that item. However, as the number of questions was unbal-
anced with regard to the sentence’s serial position (i.e., 12
questions targeting Sentence 1 vs. 16 questions targeting
Sentence 2), strong conclusions cannot be drawn here. We
can conclude that overall comprehension accuracy was high
in both Experiments 1 and 2, suggesting that participants read
the items. Furthermore, it is unlikely that we would have
found the effects we did in the current study if participants
had not read the other sentences in each item. Future studies,
however, should ensure that comprehension questions equally
target the various sentences in an item, so this can be explicitly
tested.
We can conclude that mental simulations can be updated
after changes in shape are implied across several sentences,
and that this most likely occurs through the activation of the
final shape and the deactivation of the initial shape. Future
research could focus on how much of the initial object trace
remains activated when there is a change occurring in a
narrative.
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Appendix
The meta-analysis was performed using R 3.3.2 (R Core
Team, 2016) using the package metafor (Viechtbauer, 2010)
with the following code:
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